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1. Introduction
More than ever before, the project of European integration currently seems to 
be characterized by a feverish quest of the European Union to find out who and 
what it is and who and what it wants to be. Questions of a ‘European identity’ 
loom particularly large in the context of the debates on further EU enlargement 
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ResUMeN
Basándose en datos de la encuesta 
respresentativa sobre los jóvenes en Ale-
mania, este artículo destaca tendencias 
significativas en las actitudes hacia la in-
tegracíon europea a lo largo de un periodo 
relativamente corto. La investigación de 
estas actitudes cambiantes hace pensar 
que estos cambios podrían señalar más 
que una simple reacción a corto plazo 
hacia acontecimientos políticos singulares 
una reorientación hacia la emergente con-
ceptualización de la integracíon europea 
como un proyecto de paz.
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ABsTRAcT
Using data of a representative survey 
among young people in Germany, the 
present article detects significant shifts 
in attitudes towards european integra-
tion over a relatively short time-span. 
surveying these changing attitudes, 
the article explores the idea that these 
changing attitudes could signal more 
than mere short-term reactions to sin-
gular political events, but rather point to 
a reorientation towards the initial con-
ceptualization of european integration 
as a peace project. 
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and particularly a possible accession of Turkey as an EU member. However, the 
debates on the depth of the integration process surrounding the proposed (and 
for the time being failed) project of a constitutional treaty, as well as the intensive 
debates on how the EU should assert and play its role on the stage of world politics 
(or as a ‘normative power Europe’; see Manners 2002) can be seen as part of a 
discourse on a European identity. 
As usual for symbolic constructions of collective identities, the discourse on a 
European identity is not always, and sometimes even not primarily, a discourse 
about what the EU wants to be in a ‘positive’ sense, but quite often also a discour-
se about who or what the ‘Other’ of Europe is (Diez 2004). It seems plausible to 
argue that on the level of metanarratives the quest for a European identity can be 
characterized as a move away from the founding narrative which was primarily of 
a temporal nature: Europe’s Other at the beginning of the integration project was 
Europe’s own past as a conflict-ridden and war-torn continent (Diez et al 2008). 
Much of the dynamics of the contemporary, multidimensional attempts to define a 
European identity can indeed be interpreted to anchor a European identity not in 
the difference from a temporal, but from variably either a cultural (e.g. the Muslim 
world), a geographic (‘Bosporus’, ‘Urals’), or, less pronounced, a geostrategic 
other (the U.S., Russia). 
The present contribution does neither seek to survey the enormous body of 
literature which now exists on the subject of a European identity, nor does it 
attempt to make a conceptual contribution of its own in this respect. However, 
it does start from a central conceptual assumption which is that in the long run 
no (discursive) constructions of a European identity (and the policies which are 
legitimized and framed by it) can be successfully upheld if they do not find a 
significant degree of resonance in European public opinion – a lesson taught 
to policy-makers quite forcefully in the Dutch and French referenda rejecting 
the constitutional treaty. Against this background, the aim of this contribution 
is not to add to the bourgeoning literature on European public opinion – a lite-
rature characterized by the two extremes of Eurostat surveys on the one hand 
and the theoretical discussion on whether there actually is such as thing as 
a European public opinion which is more than the sum of individual national 
public opinions. Rather, it is far more modest in that it will scrutinize attitudes 
towards Europe in but one European country, Germany, and in so doing only 
focus on attitudes among young people. The rationale for doing so is twofold: 
on a more general level, the attitudes and opinions of young people arguably 
have a seismographic function for future trends in society and can thus be 
taken as signposts of which discursive constructions can and which can not 
be successful. On a more specific level, the data to which we will refer below 
signal a quite significant shift in the attitudes towards Europe and the European 
Union among young people in Germany over recent years. We suggest that 
this shift in attitudes could actually mean more than a simple surge or ebbing 
regarding the opinion on specific issues. Rather, we argue that what we are 
witnessing here is a development which could point towards a re-orientation 
towards more traditional constructions of a European identity, i.e. Europe as 
a ‘peace project’ and not as an identity primarily asserting itself against a cul-
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tural or a geographic Other. In developing this argument, we do of course not 
claim to refer to a trend which could be seen as representative for European 
– or even German – public opinion as a whole. Yet we would claim that what 
we witness in the change of attitudes towards Europe among young people in 
Germany is a significant new development in terms of its quality which could 
– yet which by no means has to – serve as a role model for similar future 
developments in a broader European context as well. At the very minimum, 
what we witness is a development which could point a way out of those logics 
of European identity-construction which seek to construct a European identity 
primarily against ethnic, religious and geographic others, i.e. a development 
which could be seen to underpin more liberal and emancipatory pathways for 
the construction of a future European identity.
The present contribution will proceed in two steps. Primarily based on the results 
of the 15
th
 ‘Shell Jugendstudie’ (Shell Youth Survey) from 2006 (Deutsche Shell 
2006) it will map attitudes of young people in Germany towards Europe and the 
European integration process, embedded also in the context of more general 
attitudes towards globalization and on Germany’s role in the world. In a second 
step we will proceed in a more explorative fashion following the argument outlined 
so far and seek to relate these attitudes of young people in Germany towards 
the European integration process in particular and to the issue of the nature and 
contemporary state of this process in general.
2. Attitudes towards the European integration process
Europe enjoys a good deal of popularity among young people in Germany. 
When asked about their opinion as to what in general young people consider 
as being ‘in’ or ‘out’, 64% of the respondents stated that ‘Europe’ is ‘in’. Even 
though the positive attitude towards Europe in general did abate slightly in 
comparison with 2002, the majority of young people in Germany approves of 
Europe. The older the respondents, the more they consider Europe to be ‘in’. 
Since the interest in politics also increases with age, this increasing interest 
in politics in general seems to have a positive effect on the identification with 
Europe. 
Regarding more specific attitudes towards the European integration process, 
almost all of the respondents (94%) related the European Union to the ‘freedom 
to travel, study and work’. For 87%, the European Union stands for ‘cultural 
diversity’, 82% associate it with peace. Thus the major associations with the 
European Union are clearly positive. It is only in the fourth place that we find 
the first negative evaluation of the EU. 73% associate it with bureaucracy. 72% 
think that the EU implies an ‘increasing influence in world politics’, 64% associate 
it with the ‘dissemination of money’ (i.e. the Euro), 58% with a ‘lack of border 
controls’, 56% with ‘unemployment’ and 53% with ‘more crime’. For less than half 
of the young people, the European Union stands for ‘economic wealth’ (47%) 
and for ‘social security’ (33%). Quite surprisingly, young people are least of all 
concerned that the European integration process would lead to an evaporation 
of local and national cultures. 
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In general, it seems that young people in Germany are most positively disposed to-
wards the results of European integration on a cultural level as they value and enjoy 
the freedoms to travel around Europe, to study in another country, and to have the 
option to work in any EU member country they choose. Young people also cherish 
the increasing cultural diversity which results from these freedoms, i.e. the possibility 
to meet people from other countries in their hometown, at school, the workplace, or 
the university, as well as the greater variety of food, cultural events, languages and 
other products to be experienced in everyday life. 
In contrast to this rather unequivocal appreciation of the cultural dimension of the 
European integration process, its results in an economic dimension are seen in a 
more sceptical fashion.  
Not even half of the young people associate the integration process with an increase 
in economic wealth – i.e. with one of the main goals of the common market. Quite to 
the contrary, they seem to consider the European integration to be responsible for 
high unemployment rates and think that the EU’s budget could be spent more effi-
ciently.  
The political results of the European integration process are again evaluated more 
positively. The initial goal of the European project, i.e. to establish a lasting peace in 
Source: Shell Jugendstudie 2006 – TNS Infratest Sozialforschung
Figure 1. What young people in Germany associate with the European Union
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In general, it seems that young people in Germany are most positively disposed 
towards the results of European integration on a cultural level as they value and 
enjoy the freedoms to travel around Europe, to study in another country, and to 
have the option to work in any EU member country they choose. Young people also 
cherish t  increasing cultural diversity which results from these fre doms, i.e. th  
possibility to meet people from other countries in their hometown, at school, the 
workplace, or the university, as well as the greater variety of food, cultural events, 
languages and other products to be experienc d in everyday life.
In contrast to this rather unequivocal appreciation of the cultural dimension of the 
European integration process, its results in an economic dimension are seen in 
a more sceptical fashion. 
Not even half of the young people associate the integration process with an 
increase in economic w alth – i.e. with on  of the main goals of the common 
market. Quite to the cont ary, they seem to consider the European integrati  t  
be responsible for high unemployment rates and think that the EU’s budget could 
be spent more efficiently. 
The political results of the European integration process are again evaluated 
more positively. The initial goal of the European project, i.e. to establish a las-
ting peace in post-WW II Europe, is valued highly. Particularly the recent war in 
former Yugoslavia has strengthened the consciousness among young people in 
Germany that war can still take place in Europe. A slight majority of 51% even 
expresses a personal fear of another war in Europe (even though the current 
economic situation and the high unemployment rate are considered as more 
pressing matters).
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In comparison to the attitudes of young people, the population in Germany as a 
whole also primarily associates the EU with the freedom to travel, study and work 
within the EU (58%) and with the opportunity to live in peace (53%) (Eurobaro-
meter 2005, p. 15). Yet the link between Europe and peace seems to be more 
pronounced among young people in Germany. 
3. Peace trough transnationalisation
In order to judge on the relevance of the findings above it seems worthwhile to con-
textualise them within more general attitudes of young people in Germany towards 
globalisation and Germany’s international orientation and its role in the world. 
Although globalisation is primarily associated with the ‘freedom to travel, study and 
work all over the world’ (82%) and with ‘cultural diversity’ (79%), these two positive 
evaluations are immediately followed by two negative ones: a majority thinks that 
globalisation will also result in ‘unemployment’ (66%) and ‘more crime’ (59%). While 
57% also associate globalisation with ‘peace’, this link is clearly weaker than in the 
case of the valuation of the European integration process as a peace project. 
Almost three quarters of young people in Germanys (72%) believe that the European 
integration process results in an increasing influence of the EU and its member states 
in world politics. The EU is also considered to be the political institution most likely to 
be able to control negative impacts of the globalisation process. When asked which 
organisations or groups they would trust ‘altogether’, ‘to a certain extent’, ‘rather not’ 
or ‘by no means at all’, to rightly handle and respond to the challenges of the globa-
lisation process, the respondents put the EU in first place, even before the UN.
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As figure 2 shows, young people not only express great reservations about the role 
which China and the US play in the globalisation process. They also consider the 
European Union to be the most important institution to rightly administer the effects of 
globalisation, even before the UN. One could, although in a highly preliminary fash-
ion, conclude from these findings that young people in general value the EU’s in-
volvement in world politics and would support an even stronger involvement in the 
future. It is in this sense that it might also seem fair to say that in general the EU is 
increasingly perceived as a global political power rather than (merely) a global eco-
nomic one. Expectations towards the EU seem to be high that it exerts its (growing) 
influence in order to help secure and establish peace, to find solutions for environ-
mental problems, and to work against underdevelopment/inequality on a global level.  
Even if abstracting from the EU in particular it seems to be highly noteworthy that 
despite of the low interest they take in politics in general and despite their rather 
sceptical attitude towards politicians, young people express a high level of trust in 
governments and international governmental organisations to master the challenges 
posed by globalization – well before non-governmental organisations or movements 
critical of the globalization process (e.g. Attac).    
Figure 2. Confidence in the efficiency of providing solutions. “In which of the following organisa-
tions or groups do you confide altogether, to a certain extent, rather not or by no means at all, to rightly
minister the process of globalisation?” (“Altogether / to a certain extent”) 
Young people in the age from 15 to 25 years who are familiar with the term globalisation (in %)  
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Source: Shell Jugendstudie 2006 – TNS Infratest Sozialforschung  
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As figure 2 shows, young people not only express great reservations about the 
role which China and the US play in the globalisation process. They also consi-
der the European Union to be the most important institution to rightly administer 
the effects of globalisation, even before the UN. One could, although in a highly 
preliminary fashion, conclude from these findings that young people in general 
value the EU’s involvement in world politics and would support an even stronger 
involvement in the future. It is in this sense that it might also seem fair to say that 
in general the EU is increasingly perceived as a global political power rather than 
(merely) a global economic one. Expectations towards the EU seem to be high 
that it exerts its (growing) influence in order to help secure and establish peace, to 
find solutions for environmental problems, and to work against underdevelopment/
inequality on a global level. 
Even if abstracting from the EU in particular it seems to be highly noteworthy that 
despite of the low interest they take in politics in general and despite their rather 
sceptical attitude towards politicians, young people express a high level of trust 
in governments and international governmental organisations to master the cha-
llenges posed by globalization – well before non-governmental organisations or 
movements critical of the globalization process (e.g. Attac).  
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4 A declining euphoria for the EU as a single state 
Against the impression of the highly positive disposition towards the EU and its global 
role it is remarkable that within the course of only four years we witness a steep de-
cline in the number of those who support the continuation of the European integration 
process in a ‘deep’ sense, i.e. in its resulting in a single European state (s. figure 4). 
In 2002, 49% of the respondents supported the idea that the EU should develop into 
a single state in the future, while 28% rejected the idea and 27% were unsure as to 
whether to support the idea or not. In 2006, this attitude has changed dramatically: 
45% now are opposed to the idea of the EU becoming a single state in the future, 
only 32% remain in favour and 23% are still undecided. Even although the topic of 
further ‘deep’ unification will not be on the political agenda for the foreseeable future 
given the failure of the first attempt to install a Constitutional Treaty, in general this 
shift in attitudes seems to signal a declining euphoria about the institutional aspects 
of the integration process in general.  
Source: Shell Jugendstudie 2006 – TNS Infratest Sozialforschung
Figure 3. What do young people in Germany associate with globalisation?              
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integration process in a ‘deep’ sense, i.e. in its resulting in a single European sta-
te (s. figure 4). In 2002, 49% of the respondents supported the idea that the EU 
should develop into a single state in the future, while 28% rejected the idea and 
27% were unsure as to whether to support the idea or not. In 2006, this attitude 
has changed dramatically: 45% now are opposed to the idea of the EU becoming 
a single state in the future, only 32% remain in favour and 23% are still undeci-
ded. Even although the topic of further ‘deep’ unification will not be on the political 
agenda for the foreseeable future given the failure of the first attempt to install a 
Constitutional Treaty, in general this shift in attitudes seems to signal a declining 
euphoria about the institutional aspects of the integration process in general. 
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We also find a growing scepticism against further EU enlargement. Whereas in 2002 
the big round of Eastern Enlargement, with the admission of 10 new member states 
in 2005, was favoured by 44% of the young people and opposed by 32%, in 2006 
only 19% would support an accession of Turkey while 61% would oppose it.  
5 Back to European basics 
Following up on the observations on attitudes towards further EU enlargement and 
particularly upon possible Turkish EU membership, analyses of the prevalent dis-
courses on the Balkans and Turkey in relation to Europe demonstrate that the main 
arguments used to point out the ‘incoherence’ of the Balkans and Turkey refer to 
these states’ claiming an ‘anachronistic’, ‘heroic’ identity, whereas Western Europe 
moved on to a post-heroic identity (Quenzel, 2005). Heroic cultures differ from post-
heroic cultures as far as in heroic cultures social recognition can still be achieved 
through sacrifices made in armed struggle/war, while in post-heroic cultures the 
readiness to die for the Fatherland is no longer of social significance. According to 
the heroic/post-heroic thesis, this acceptance of individual sacrifice as a means to 
gain recognition is missing in current EU member countries particularly because of 
their negative relation – strengthened by and through the European integration proc-
Source: Shell Jugendstudie 2006 – TNS Infratest Sozialforschung
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cultures the readiness to die for the Fatherland is no longer of social significance. 
According to the heroic/post-heroic thesis, this acceptance of individual sacri-
fice as a means to gain recognition is missing in current EU member countries 
particularly because of their negative relation – strengthened by and through 
the European integration process – to Europe’s past as a war-torn continent. 
Particularly in the case of Turkey it is thus, for example, not the genocide on the 
Armenian people which is held against the country, but the collective denial of 
guilt – and thus its self-exclusion from a European ‘community of memory’ with 
an associated negative relation to the past (see, for example, Winkler, 2004 and 
Münkler, 2004).  
It is in this sense that Giesen (2002: 208ff) points out that many Western nations 
have replaced triumphant founding myths with references to a traumatic past and 
that these memories include victims as well as perpetrators. These new traumatic 
foundations of collective memory contrast sharply with some post-war attempts 
to clean up a nation’s image by claiming the guilt of another nation or of specific 
groups within a nation. This common memory of a traumatic past now provides 
Europe with a ‘tacitly assumed moral consensus: an European collective identity 
based on the horror of the past’ (ibid.: 209). The strong reaction of and within the 
EU to the right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ) joining the Austrian government in 
2000 can in this sense be interpreted as a reaction towards a challenge of this 
conception of a European self. We would like to argue that it is exactly this tacit 
agreement which is on its way to more and more become a part of a collective 
European identity not only among young people in Germany, but also among 
young Europeans in general. 
We would like to illustrate this observation using but one prominent example in 
the form of recent activities of the European Youth Forum, a federation of more 
than 90 National Youth Councils and International Non-Governmental Youth Or-
ganisation which seeks to represent the interests of the young people in Europe. 
It would of course be wrong to see this Forum as representative for all young 
Europeans. However, its activities provide important clues as to the interests of 
those young people in Europe who take an active interest in the future shape 
of Europe. Indeed, since politically active young people often serve as opinion 
leaders, we may consider the declarations of the European Youth Forum as a 
potential seismograph for the attitudes of young Europeans towards the Euro-
pean integration process.  
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the European Youth 
Forum, in March 2007 published the ‘Rome Youth Declaration’ (European Youth 
Forum 2007), a postulate in the name of all young Europeans concerning the state 
of the European integration process. At its very beginning, the ‘Rome Youth Decla-
ration’ refers to the founding intentions of the European project, to ensure ‘peace’ 
in a war-torn continent: ‘We, the young people of Europe, gathered in Rome on 
the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome to pay tribute to and 
continue the vision of those who made it possible for us to grow up in an environ-
ment of peace and prosperity, democracy and rule of law’ (ibid.). Thus the Treaty of 
Rome is highlighted as the reason why young Europeans can live in a peaceful and 
democratic Europe and indeed this vision of a peaceful Europe – or rather the con-
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tinuation of it – serves as the rationale for the convention in Rome and the ensuing 
declaration. This means that the initial intentions of Robert Schumann – expressed 
in his declaration of 9 May 1950 (Schumann 1950), which is considered the founding 
speech of the European Community – to create a lasting peace in Europe through 
a solidarity in the production of coal and steel between France and Germany that 
‘will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely 
unthinkable, but materially impossible’ are acknowledged by the young Europeans 
as the paramount achievement of the European Union. 
In the following paragraph the ‘Rome Youth Declaration’ states that the EU is ‘a 
place of equality, freedom, tolerance, and solidarity’ and that the process of inte-
gration preserves uniqueness and diversity. Of special interest for our argument 
here are also the following paragraphs connecting the failure of the Constitutional 
Treaty with the challenges of globalisation. Read closely it contains a rather complex 
argument. It ascribes to the European project a loss of direction and inspiration 
which led to an increasing uncertainty and dissatisfaction among the European 
people; as a consequence, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the voters 
of France and the Netherlands is interpreted as a reaction to a lack of vision. The 
European Union is further accused of not dealing adequately with the opportuni-
ties and serious challenges of globalisation. The European Youth Forum outlines 
its primary expectations towards a future European Union as follows: ‘We want a 
European Union that promotes democratic values and Human Rights. We want a 
European Union that promotes sustainability, preserving our environment for future 
generations. We want a European Union that promotes the economic success and 
the social responsibility for all its citizens, especially the ones who are in greater 
need. We want a European Union that assumes its role in our globalised world’ 
(European Youth Forum 2007). 
Accordingly one of the main aims of the ‘Rome Youth Declaration’ is to make the 
European Union fit for future challenges by giving it direction and inspiration. And 
interesting enough the promotion of democratic values and human rights are 
emphasized in particular. Sustainability and environmental issues rank second on 
the agenda, followed by economic success and social responsibility. Similar to the 
results of the Shell Youth Survey 2006 it seems that young people from all over 
Europe do not consider European integration primarily as an economic project. 
Here too the cultural and political achievements and especially the idea of Europe 
as a peace project are acknowledged as centre pieces of European integration. 
6. Peace and democracy as a cornerstone of a European 
identity  
If we follow the idea that the formation of a collective identity requires a self-des-
cription of the community as an entity and hence the confinement against others 
not belonging to one’s community (see for example Lepsius 1997: 949ff; Anderson 
1983; Hall 1994: 196f, Laclau & Mouffe 1991: 164), then a European identity needs 
a self-description as an entity and ideas of what distinguishes Europe from other 
parts of the world. As Glynis Breakwell (2004: 34) points out: ‘One main problem 
with describing the character of the identity element that might be generated by EU 
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membership is that the EU as a category in itself is changing.’ The history of the 
European integration is also the history of its enlargement. The six founder states 
from 1958, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and Germany, were 
joined in 1973 by the northern countries Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark. The 
south of Europe followed with Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1886. 
The EFTA-countries Sweden, Finland and Austria joined the EU in 1995. 2004 fo-
llowed the so called ‘Eastern enlargement’ with Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic. The newest 
members, Bulgaria and Rumania, joined in 2007. The permanent change of the 
borders of the European Union precludes a perception of the European Union as 
a fixed entity. And the discussion about the borders of the European Union is not 
likely to disappear over the next years. Currently the accession of Turkey to the 
European Union dominates the discussion. Yet the list of potential accession coun-
tries includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Island, Macedonia, Moldavia, 
Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Serbia and Montenegro, the Ukraine, Belarus, and 
also Israel. This list  in itself demonstrates that the discussion about the borders of 
the European Union is not likely to abate in the near future. 
As Castano (2004: 41ff) demonstrated in a series of experiments, the perceived 
‘entity-ness’ of a community is a critical factor for a positive identification with Euro-
pe. Presenting the EU as having fuzzy borders to the participants in the experiments 
did reduce their level of identification dramatically (ibid.: 48f). However, in order 
to perceive the European Union as an entity it is not necessary for it to fulfil the 
criterion of cultural homogeneity. In contrast to many other political communities, 
cultural or even ethnic homogeneity is not considered as the basis of the European 
community. The European integration process was initiated to avoid the negative 
consequences that followed from a strong nationalism based on the idea of cultural 
and ethnic homogeneity, thus consequently diversity and not homogeneity serves 
a basic principle underlying the European Union. Castano (ibid.: 43f) further ar-
gues that what mediates a common identity is not whether it is homogeneous or 
not, but the extent to which it acquires a psychological existence, in other words 
a self-representation as an entity at a collective level. One way to acquire a psy-
chological existence in the minds of the Europeans is to behave as an actor and 
to be recognized as such by other actors, like the U.S, Russia, China, and the UN 
etc.; and that this recognition first took place during the war in Yugoslavia, when 
the EU was acknowledged by the UN as a political actor (ibid.:53). 
During the last years the EU increasingly acted as political actor on a global stage 
and could thus be perceived as an entity possessing intentionality and the capa-
city of action in world politics. The perception of the EU as a global political actor 
gaining influence, but also disillusions regarding world political events (e.g. the 
war in Iraq), could help to explain why expectations towards the EU as an actor 
in global politics have risen among younger people.
7. Conclusion
As we were able to show with data drawn from the Shell Youth Survey 2006, 
Europe is widely appreciated by young people in Germany. Their main association 
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with the European Union are positive and refer primarily to the cultural and politi-
cal impacts of the integration process, i.e. the freedom to travel, study, and work 
with in the European Union, cultural diversity, and peace. This means that young 
people in Germany are rather positively disposed towards the cultural and political 
achievements of the integration process than on its results on the economic level, 
which are seen more sceptically. The representatives of the European youth orga-
nisations refer even more clearly to the European integration as a peace project. 
In accordance with the attitudes of the young people in Germany they also point 
out cultural diversity as an important part of the European identity. Their vision 
for Europe is a European Union as promoter of democratic values, human rights, 
sustainability, economic success, and social justice and they support and indeed 
ask for an increasing role of the EU in world politics. Young people in Germany 
also consider the European Union as the institution in order to control the negative 
impacts of the globalisation process. Thus both groups agree in seeing the EU 
as a global political power rather than merely an economic one and they express 
their expectation towards the EU to exceed its growing influence in order to help 
to secure and establish peace, find solutions for environmental problems and work 
against social injustice on a global level. 
On the other hand (and here we only have data from young people in Germany), 
we witness a declining support for the ‘deepening’ process of the European in-
tegration. This indicates a declining euphoria about the further transmission of 
sovereign national rights to the European Union among young people. In addition 
we find a growing scepticism against further EU enlargement. 
Taken together, these attitudes towards the European integration process seem 
rather contradictory: Young people in Germany value the cultural and political achie-
vements of European integration, they expect the EU to become more influential 
in world politics and to regulate the negative impacts of the globalisation process, 
yet they disapprove of the ‘deepening’ as well as of the ‘enlargement’ process.  
However, the attitudes appear to be less contradictory if we accept Giesen’s 
(2002: 208ff) concept of a moral consensus, based on the European experiences 
of war and genocide, as a common European identity. Thus we can understand 
the importance of democracy and human rights as a dominant part of the Euro-
pean self-description and also the claim towards the European Union to secure 
and establish peace, advance democracy and work against social injustice. The 
rejection of a homogeneous culture as foundation of European identity and the 
distinct approval of cultural diversity and of tolerance as a dominant part of the 
European self-description may underlie some more sceptical dispositions towards 
the deepening process.   
Yet the self-description as a community which has learned from its past and which 
took political action to prevent war and genocide, and which is commited to the 
values of democracy and tolerance as well as to the Human Rights is not only the 
foundation of the integration process. In contrast to a self-description as a continent 
with a shared ethno-cultural history, i.e., for example, as a Christian community, 
it allows to perceive the EU as a political actor that had the capacity to establish 
lasting peace in a war-torn continent and that is able to exert its influence in this 
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manner on a global level as well. In this way the European Union can be perceived 
as an entity even though its borders did change frequently in the past and will 
change again in the future. 
The self-description as a moral community also fulfils the symbolic need for a 
sense of transcendence. Peace, democracy and the human rights are considered 
as universal values. They are values in and for themselves. Even though these 
values were frequently violated during history, this does not diminish their validity. 
Thus the identification with Europe as a community of moral consensus allows the 
individual to be part of a concept that outlasts its own physical existence.  
By way of conclusion we would like to emphasize once more that the argument 
presented here does not at all claim to have extrapolated future trends of the Eu-
ropean integration process from representative data covering European society 
as a whole. Rather, we have taken some remarkable empirical findings regarding 
the attitude towards Europe among young people in Germany as a starting point to 
engage in what can be little more than a theoretically informed speculation about 
a future European Union which might see its increasing role in world politics to be 
accompanied by a (re-)construction of its identity ‘back to basics’, i.e. a sharper 
focus on and a self-understanding as a peace project. This is not to argue that 
this is the best what the EU or the construction of a European identity can hope 
for. But if additional research could show that what we can suspect looking at the 
young generation of the EU’s largest member country can also claim validity on a 
wider European scale, then it is certainly not the worst it can hope for as well.
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